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PROBLEMS REGARDING AVIATION LITIGATION
JOHN J. KENNELLY*
N JULY, 1971, the Annual Convention of the American Bar As-
sociation will be held in London. It is estimated that at least
10,000 American lawyers and judges, many accompanied by
their wives, will fly to London this summer for the convention.
How many of these lawyers and judges realize that if they and
their wives are killed or permanently injured, during any portion of
their flights to London, the recovery may be limited to $75,000 per
death or injury insofar as the airline is concerned, regardless of the
extent of provable damages, and whether or not the airline's negli-
gence is undisputable?
Here are specific examples:
(a.) Assume Judge Jones, from Chicago, Illinois, is 40 years of
age, has a wife and 5 children, and is earning $40,000 per year. He
is killed while flying from Chicago to London due to the negligence
of the airline. What remedy has the family of the wrongfully killed
Judge?
(b.) Assume lawyer Smith, from Des Moines, Iowa, also age 40,
also earning $40,000 per year, and also having a wife and 5 children,
arranges with his travel agent to fly from Des Moines to Chicago, and
thence to London. While Smith is flying on an apparently domestic
airline from Des Moines to Chicago, the plane crashes. He is se-
verely injured and rendered a quadraplegic, requiring life-long hospi-
talization. What is the remedy of lawyer Smith against an admittedly
negligent domestic airline?
(c.) Suppose Chicago lawyer Williams, who is also age 40, earns
* MR. KENNELLY has been a practicing lawyer in Chicago since 1939. He
received Ph.B and I.D. Degrees at Loyola University; he is a Fellow, American
College of Trial Lawyers; member, International Academy of Trial Lawyers;
Chairman, Aviation Section, International Society of Barristers; member, Inter-
American Bar Association; Past President, Illinois Trial Lawyers Association; Author,
LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES (1968) and numerous articles.
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$40,000 a year, and has a wife and 5 minor children, flies safely to
London, but then, due to inclement weather, he decides, while in
London, to fly from London to Rome, and while in Rome decides to
fly to Athens. He is killed while en route from Rome to Athens.
Prior to his departure from Chicago, after purchasing his Chicago-
London-Chicago ticket, he purchased $150,000 in insurance either
through the use of a machine or from a sales girl at the airport. In
either case, an envelope was provided for immediate mailing, and he
put the policy in the envelope and mailed it to his wife. What are
the rights of his widow and 5 children, both against the indisputably
negligent airline which was flying from Rome to Athens when he was
killed, and against the insurance company?
These are the answers:
(a.) The widow and children of Judge Jones might be limited
to a maximum recovery of $75,000 against the negligent airline,
although the provable pecuniary damages alone easily exceed
$500,000.1
(b.) As to Des Moines lawyer Smith, who was rendered a quad-
raplegic while flying from Des Moines to Chicago on a domestic car-
rier, his maximum recovery likewise might be limited to $75,000.
This might be true even though the airline admits its negligence.2
(c.) The family of attorney Williams might be limited to a maxi-
mum recovery of $16,600 against the airline. They might well re-
ceive nothing from the insurance company.'
Damages for either injury or death in international air travel re-
coverable against airlines, even though admittedly negligent, may be
limited:
(1.) The Warsaw Convention Treaty,4 initially adopted in War-
saw, Poland, in 1929, limits damages to $8,291.87 for negligence.
This treaty is applicable to most international air travel except where
there is a "contact" with the United States.
1. The Montreal Interim Agreement provides a limit of $75,000.
2. Id.
3. The Hague Protocol provides a limit of $16,582.
4. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, October 12, 1929. Adherence by the
United States was declared June 27, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000 et seq. (1934); T.S. 876
(effective October 29, 1934). Hereinafter this Treaty will be referred to by its
popularly accepted description, the Warsaw Convention.
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(2.) The Warsaw Convention Treaty was modified by an "Agree-
ment" approved by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board on
May 15, 1966.' This "Interim Agreement" prescribed a $75,000
maximum liability, regardless of fault, whenever the air travel has a
"contact" with the United States, namely, whenever any place in the
United States constitutes the ticketed point of origin, destination, or
agreed stopping place.
(3.) The Hague Protocol is a treaty concluded in 1955, entered
into force on August 1, 1963, which modifies the Warsaw Conven-
tion by increasing the maximum liability of airlines in international
travel to $16,582. The Hague Protocol was not ratified by the Uni-
ted States.6 The Hague Protocol, however, may apply to American
citizens who are flying between signatories to this particular treaty,
even though the United States did not ratify the treaty.
The limitation of monetary liability is applicable to airlines only.
Manufacturers or any other defendant are not so limited.
THE WARSAW TREATY
The history of the Warsaw conference is bizarre. In a meeting at
Warsaw, Poland, in 1929, in which the United States did not even of-
ficially participate, some "diplomats" convened. They drafted a
"treaty" which purported to limit forever the recovery of families of
victims of airplane crashes to 125,000 gold francs (now $8,291.87,
then much less) against airlines for negligent operation during "inter-
national travel," regardless of the age of the victim, earnings, degree
of dependency, or any other applicable criterion of damages. A pas-
senger negligently killed in an airplane crash could be the husband of
a sick wife, and the father of minor children; some of whom could be
paralyzed or mentally ill, and all totally dependent upon him. Never-
theless, his family would still be drastically limited in their recovery
of damages against the airline, in spite of its fault. The victim could
be a leading neurosurgeon, lawyer, businessman, or judge. No mat-
ter what the proof was of the extent of pecuniary loss to his family,
the recovery against the negligent airline would be severely limited,
if the original terms of the Warsaw Treaty applied. If the Hague
5. C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2, Docket 17325, Agreement C.A.B.
6. S. EXEC. Doc. H. 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); S. EXEC. REPT. No. 3, 89th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
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Protocol applied, as it would to a flight between Rome and Athens,
the limitation would be only $16,582; if the 1966 Montreal Interim
Agreement were applicable (assuming the flight had a "contact" with
the United States, as it would in a flight between Chicago and Lon-
don), the limitation of the negligent airline's liability to $75,000
would similarly be grossly inadequate, for it might not cover two
years pecuniary loss.
The Warsaw Convention was the result of two international con-
ferences, one held in Paris in 1925, the other in Warsaw in 1929, and/
of the work done by the Interim Comitg International Technique d'Ex-
perts Juridique Agriens (CITEJA), created by the Paris Conference.
Civil aviation at that time was still in its infancy. The total airline
operations in the five-year period 1925 to 1929-in domestic as well
as foreign travel-were only 400 million passenger miles. The fa-
tality rate was 45 per 100 million passenger miles. This compares
with the vastly improved safety rate of 0.55 fatalities per 100 million
passenger miles in 1965. The larger airlines could carry a few pas-
sengers at cruising speeds of about 100 miles per hour and over stages
of about 500 miles. The most advanced and popular United States
aircraft, the Lockheed Vega, which carried six passengers and a pilot
had a cruising speed of about 120 miles per hour and a range of 550
miles. 7 It is difficult to believe that this group of people who met in
Poland in 1929 could formulate a document which would unilaterally
become a treaty upon adherence by any nation, so as to constitute an
everlasting restriction upon the basic rights of the passenger public,
when over forty years later international flight has become common-
place.
The project of the Conference was twofold. First, since aviation
was obviously going to link many lands with different languages, cus-
toms, and legal systems, it was desirable to establish at the outset a
certain degree of uniformity. The Convention achieved this almost
completely as to documentation-tickets, waybills, and the like. The
second goal was to limit the potential liability of the carrier in case of
accidents. The Convention established internationally the rule that
carriers are liable for damages sustained by a passenger in the course
of a flight, or while embarking or disembarking, but limited this lia-
bility to 125,000 "Poincar6 francs"-then $4,898 and now approxi-
7. GIBBS-SMITH, THE AEROPLANE: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 97-100 (1960).
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mately 8300 United States dollars. This dollar equivalent has been
in effect since the United States devaluation in 1933, but the limit
was low even in 1929. But it was expected that such a limit, ap-
plied uniformly on international flights, would enable airlines to at-
tract capital during their infancy.
In 1934, the State Department transmitted its approval of the orig-
inal Warsaw Treaty to the President; the President submitted the
treaty to the Senate; and on June 15, 1934, without debate, commit-
tee hearing, or report, the Senate gave its advice and consent by voice
vote. 8 The United States deposited its instrument of adherence on
July 31, 1934, and the President proclaimed the Treaty ninety days
later.' Thus, although the United States had nothing to do with for-
mulation of the convention and had adhered rather than ratified, it
was almost a charter member.
In critically evaluating the seemingly precipitate action of the Sen-
ate, it must be remembered that, in 1933, economic conditions
throughout the world were disastrous. There was virtually no inter-
national air transportation at that time and the very few who engaged
in such transportation flew in four and six-passenger planes on short
European trips, such as from Paris to London. The accident rate
was eighty times greater than at present. There was no capital for
any industries, let alone airlines. It is clear that in our present jet
age, all of the "reasons" for extending preferential treatment to
airlines have not only long disappeared, but the opposite is also now
the fact.
Article 22 provides that a higher limitation of liability with respect
to the transportation of passengers than that stipulated in the Conven-
tion may be agreed upon between the carrier and the passenger.'"
Almost forty years have elapsed since the Warsaw Convention Treaty
was drafted, while the airlines have grown from fledgling companies
to financial giants, some of whose stock prices have risen over
1,000% even in recent years despite the present recession. Yet not
a single international air carrier saw fit to raise the limitation one
cent over the $8,291 for approximately thirty-five years until 1966,
8. 78 Cong. Rec. 11,582 (1934).
9. 49 Stat. 3000 (1934) T.S. 876 (effective October 29, 1934). See also,
Address by John J. Kennelly, Southern Methodist University Air Law Symposium,
March 18, 1971.
10. Id. at 3019.
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although the Warsaw Convention contained explicit provisions author-
izing such increases by airlines. And when some airlines finally
"contracted" among themselves to limit their own liability to $75,000
per passenger, they restricted this increase to such international flights
as had a contact with the United States. 1
THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
The Hague Protocol is a treaty originally formulated at The Hague,
Netherlands, in September of 1955. This treaty became effective
August 1, 1963; however, the United States has never adhered to it. 2
Insofar as the damage limitation is concerned, The Hague Protocol
increased the Warsaw Convention limitation 100%, from $8,291 to
$16,582. Although the United States has not ratified The Hague
Protocol, as above noted, its provisions still apply to United States
citizens, as well as to citizens of other nations who are engaged in cer-
tain types of international air travel. In plain language, if an Amer-
ican citizen's contract of carriage (ticket) specifies as the origin and
ultimate destination of an international flight two countries, both of
which are signatories to The Hague Protocol, the limitation of dam-
ages recoverable against a negligent airline may be $16,582 for any
injury or death.
An exception to both the Warsaw Convention and The Hague
Protocol is provided for by the Interim Agreement entered into by
certain airlines, which became effective in May of 1966.11 Even
though the United States is not a party to The Hague Protocol, its
restrictive damage limitation provisions may apply to United States
citizens traveling abroad between Hague Protocol signatory coun-
tries. It is important to note that the damage limitation provisions of
both the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol are based up-
on the existing contract of carriage: namely, the form of the ticket;
not the citizenship of the passengers nor necessarily the actual origi-
nating point of the accident flight, nor the actual destination point
of the passenger involved in a fatal accident. What counts is not
the point of origin or the point of destination relating to the actual
11. Montreal Interim Agreement; C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2, Docket 17325,
Agreement C.A.B. 18900, May 13, 1966.
12. S. Exec. Doc. H, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); S. Exec. Rept. No. 3, 89th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
13. C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2, Docket 17325, Agreement C.A.B.
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accident flight, but where the entire ticketed trip originated and
where the entire ticketed trip was intended to terminate.
THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
AS MODIFIED BY THE MONTREAL "INTERIM AGREEMENT"
OF MAY 13, 1966
For many years before 1966, not only the United States but also
other nations were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the arbi-
trarily established minimal monetary limitation of damages prescribed
by the Warsaw Convention. On September 28, 1955, The Hague
Protocol was drafted. It became effective August 1, 1963, as to
those nations which ratified it. The Hague Protocol increased the
Warsaw Convention limitation from $8,291 to $16,582, but was
never ratified by the United States because the increase in the mone-
tary limitation was so nominal. 4 Likewise, many United States Sen-
ators and others were understandably alarmed that the family of a
passenger wrongfully killed in international flight could recover only
a small amount from a negligent airline.
Consequently, the United States Government served notice of de-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention, to become effective May 15,
1966. Shortly before the denunciation was to become effective, the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) brought about an
arrangement among air carriers having landing privileges in the
United States, which increased the limitation of liability of such sig-
natory airlines to $75,000 per passenger in international flight, re-
gardless of negligence. On May 13, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics
Board "approved" this "agreement,"' 5 and on May 14, 1966, the
United States withdrew its notice of denunciation." The net effect
of the agreement approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
United States on May 13, 1966, was that certain airlines agreed
among themselves to increase the payment for either a death or injury
in international travel to a maximum of $75,000, regardless of their
negligence.
The agreement required the airline signatories, commencing on
14. S. Exec. Doc. H, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959); S. Exec. Rept. No. 3,
89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).
15. C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2, Docket 17325, Agreement C.A.B.
16. Dep't State Press Release, No. 111, at 1, May 14, 1966.
442 [Vol. XX:436
1971] PROBLEMS REGARDING AVIATION LITIGATION
May 16, 1966, to include in their tariffs a separate contract in ac-
cordance with Article 22 (1) of the Convention. This tariff pro-
vided for a limit of liability for either injury or death of $75,000, in-
clusive of legal fees. In those states where provision was made for a
seperate award for legal fees and costs, a limit of $58,000 was pro-
vided, exclusive of legal fees and costs.
This maximum limitation is applicable only to such international
transportation by the carrier, as defined in the Warsaw Convention,
which includes a point in the United States as a point of origin, des-
tination, or agreed stopping place. This liability is imposed upon
the airline regardless of fault. The defenses of Article 20(1) of the
Convention (or the Convention as Amended by the Protocol) are
not available. The Interim Agreement does not change the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention with reference to wilful misconduct.
The air carrier is liable for full damages if wilful misconduct is proven
by the passenger, or, in the event of his death, by his personal repre-
sentative or heirs.
Any carrier may become a party to this agreement by signing a
counterpart of the agreement and depositing it with the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Withdrawal from the agreement may be effected by
giving twelve months written notice to the Board and the other car-
rier parties.
VALIDITY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION, THE HAGUE PROTOCOL,
MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT,
AND THE PROPOSED NEW TREATY
As of the present time, the validity of these treaties and Montreal
Interim Agreement has not been passed upon by any Appellate Court.
But in a fairly recent opinion, Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,17
Cook County Circuit Judge Nicholas J. Bua ruled that the Warsaw
Convention's damages and venue provisions were unconstitutional.
The court also held that, apart from unconstitutionality, the Warsaw
Treaty limitations did not apply to that particular case because the
tickets supplied to the passenger-victim did not contain adequate
warning of the damage and venue limitation provisions, and, also,
17. 11 Avi. 17,351 (111. Cir. Cook Co. Oct. 21, 1969); 10 Avi. 15,151 (Ill.
Cir. Cook Co. Nov. 7, 1968).
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because one of the countries involved in the total flight as its point of
origin (namely, Singapore) had not then adhered to the treaty.
The facts were undisputed. On February 28, 1966, Mr. Burdell
embarked on an air journey from Singapore to Tokyo and a return
to Singapore with intermediate stops at Bangkok and Hong Kong.
An airline ticket was issued to him at Singapore. He flew from Sing-
apore to Bangkok to Hong Kong on Cathay Pacific Airways. On
March 4, 1966, he flew from Hong Kong to Tokyo on a Canadian
Pacific Airlines flight.
The Canadian Pacific-operated airliner was a Douglas DC-8. Up-
on arrival in the Tokyo area, it circled Tokyo Airport for approxi-
mately one hour, due to extremely thick fog and obviously very
hazardous conditions. The pilot then told the control tower at Tokyo
Airport that he would head for Taiwan. Nonetheless, he attempted
to land in the thick fog at Tokyo, and quickly turned into an ap-
proach pattern over Tokyo Bay and headed down toward the runway.
At the end of the runway the plane rammed a seawall, somersaulted
and exploded into flame, killing its crew of ten and all but eight of its
62 passengers.
In defending an action brought by Mr. Burdell's estate, Canadian
Pacific Airlines asserted: (1.) All rights of the heirs of Burdell
were limited by the Warsaw Convention for the reasons that (a.) the
point of origin of Burdell's trip on defendant's airline was Hong
Kong, and both the Crown Colony of Hong Kong and Japan were
signatories and adherents to the Warsaw Convention; and that (b.)
even if Singapore were to be deemed the point of origin of decedent's
flight, Singapore was also an adherent to the treaty. (2.) There-
fore plaintiffs could not seek relief in the courts of Illinois or, indeed,
in any court in the United States, but must maintain their actions in
Hong Kong, Tokyo, Canada or Singapore, even though plaintiffs were
(as was Mr. Burdell) citizens of the United States and of the State
of Illinois, and even though defendant airline admittedly carried on
business within the State of Illinois and had been properly served
with summons. The basis for this contention was that the Warsaw
Convention required suit to be brought at: (a.) the domicile of the
carrier; (b.) the principal place of business of the carrier; (c.) the
place where the contract of carriage was made; or (d.) the destina-
tion. In short, Canadian Pacific contended that plaintiffs, United
[Vol. XX:436444
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States citizens, had to bring their actions in Singapore, Hong Kong,
Tokyo, or Canada, even though it was conceded that (except for the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, if applicable and if valid) the
Circuit Court of Cook County had jurisdiction of the parties and of
the subject matter. (3.) Therefore the recoverable damages of
plaintiffs were limited to $8,291.
In reply, plaintiff contended that (A.) Both the damage and the
venue limitations of the Warsaw Convention were unconstitutional:
(1.) The Warsaw Treaty, insofar as it purported to limit dam-
ages to $8,291, was unconstitutional because it is violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. (2.)
The Warsaw Treaty, insofar as it purported to restrict the right of
the plaintiffs to bring their action solely in the courts of Hong Kong,
Singapore or Canada, was also unconstitutional, because it took away
the fundamental right of every citizen to seek redress in the courts
of this country against any defendant concededly otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this country.
(B.) Even if both the damage and the venue limitations of the
Warsaw Convention were constitutional, neither was applicable to
the Burdell case because: (1.) The ticket issued to the decedent
in this case did not provide him with an adequate warning of the
applicability of either limitation. (2.) Singapore was the point of
origin of decedent's flight, and Singapore became a completely in-
dependent sovereign nation in 1965, prior to the accident, and did
not itself become a signatory to the Warsaw Convention until after
the accident. Articles 38 and 40 of the Convention prescribe specific
requirements for adherence and ratification by any nation, and the
independent, sovereign nation of Singapore did not comply with those
mandatory requirements until after the accident.
Both the attorneys representing the plaintiffs, the widow and chil-
dren, and the airline's attorneys invited the court to rule upon all
issues, including constitutionality. After the opinion of Judge Bua
was published, however, the airline requested the court to withdraw
its ruling concerning constitutionality. The court granted this mo-
tion, stating, however, that it was persuaded that the Warsaw Con-
vention damage and venue limitation provisions, as applied to this
case, were unconstitutional. The case was settled for $215,000.
This decision, although that of a Circuit Court, rather than an
1971]
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Appellate Court, is of considerable significance, especially in the
light of two recent decisions, one from the United States Supreme
Court, Moragne v. States and Marine Lines,18 the other from the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hornsby v. The Fish Meal Co. 9
Moragne and Hornsby, respectively, eradicate any constitutional ba-
sis for any statute or treaty which would deny a fair recovery for
the wrongful killing of a human being. The author believes that
under basic constitutional law, no statute or treaty may take away
from the family of a wrongful death victim or severely injured pas-
senger that fair recovery to which he is entitled under the common
law. The treaty's limitations apply only to airlines. In Burdell, the
court ruled that this discriminatory preference for airlines had no
rational basis, and denied due process of law not only to the plaintiff,
but also to the co-defendant manufacturer, Douglas Aircraft Com-
pany. The treaty afforded no protection to concurrently negligent
aircraft manufacturers or other defendants. In other words, if a
verdict had been rendered in Burdell in the exact amount of the sub-
sequent settlement, namely, $215,000, and if the manufacturer,
Douglas Aircraft Company, were held liable along with the airline,
the manufacturer would have had to pay $206,709, whereas the
much more negligent airline would have had to pay only $8,291,
or approximately 4 % of the total recovery.
In plain words, the Warsaw Convention grants enormous prefer-
ential treatment only to airlines with respect to their liability for
damages for their negligence in international air transportation. The
Burdell opinion properly referred to the absurdity of this preferen-
tial forty-year-old treaty, as applied to that case.
Professor Arthur John Keeffe stated with reference to Burdell:
It is a dreadful thing to have to say, but, in truth, decisions such as Kilberg, Pear-
son, Long, and Scott, lack the simplicity and honesty of Judge Bua's ruling in
Burdell. Here at last is a Judge who faces up to the real problems, the constitu-
tionality of outrageous, discriminatory, out-of-date, rotten laws.2o
Thus, few courts have faced up to the real issue: the constitutionality
of treaties or statutes which would grant grossly discriminatory pre-
ferential treatment.
18. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
19. 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. Keefe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The" True National
Common Cause, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 316, 353-357 (1969).
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There is no question that treaties, like statutes, are subject to con-
stitutional restraint.2' Statutory patterns which result in arbitrary
discrimination have been held violative of both state and federal con-
stitutional safeguards. In Harvey v. Clyde Park District,22 the court
ruled that legislation which restricted the amount of damages recov-
erable against school districts or similar public institutions was un-
constitutional. Distribution of risks through insurance was a factor
not unnoticed in reaching the eventual decision.
What about the cost of insurance in relation to international air
travel? Two students of this economic problem have stated:
Allowing for a reasonable margin of error in what were conceded to be only
estimates, the incremental insurance costs at various limits, taken as a proportion of
operating cost, were clearly somewhere between the cost of the olive and the cost
of the gin in the martini, and nowhere near the cost of an inflight movie.
23
Concerning the cost of the elimination of the Warsaw Convention,
members of the staff of the Civil Aeronautics Board reached the
conclusion: "The increase in insurance cost to the carriers, in the
event they are subjected to unlimited liability as a result of U.S.
withdrawl from the Warsaw Convention, would be minimal. 24
In any event, no one can dispute that insurance carriers, both
United States and foreign, have served the aircraft industry well; and
if higher rates, commensurate with the potential liability from larger,
faster aircraft, are required, they should be paid. Certainly, no mem-
ber of the passenger public would complain about minimal increases
if he and his family were reasonably protected.
The airlines are currently working with the State Department in
an effort to have a new treaty adopted which will attempt to insulate
and protect commercial airlines from liability for either injury or
21. COWLES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 28; Cochrane v. United
States, 92 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. den. 303 U.S. 636 (1938); RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 117(d), Comment (1965); 52 AM. JUR., Treaties,
p. 809 (1944); STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 1508 (1833); COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 (1880);
Cherokee v. United States, 78 U.S. 616 (1870); DOWLING and EDWARDS, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298; WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 182 (1947); MacBride,
Treaties versus the Constitution, 26 INT'L LAW PAMPHLETS 17.
22. Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965).
23. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States & the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 554 (1967).
24. IGIA Document 23/1.10, Final Action, August 7, 1962, Attachment D, at 1.
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death.25  The amazing thing about this proposed treaty is that only
airlines are to be insulated from all damages except to the extent of
$100,000, even though the airline is not merely negligent, but even
reckless. It is incomprehensible that manufacturers and compo-
nent-part makers of aircraft, numbering over 25,000 companies in
the United States alone, not to speak of the many thousands of such
manufacturers in England, Germany, Italy, Japan and other coun-
tries, are going to sit by and permit themselves to continue to be sub-
jected to strict liability-even though they are not negligent-while
at the same time commercial airlines, although negligent, or even
reckless, are permitted to gain discriminatory and preferential treat-
ment from the United States Senate, by way of treaty. It should
also be noted that the proposed treaty will definitely and substantially
work to the detriment of the United States Government.
Entirely apart from the rights of plaintiffs, what of the rights of
manufacturers, component part makers, private aircraft owners and
operators, and even the United States Government? How many
manufacturers, or even their counsel, know that under the present
state of the law they may be liable for unlimited damages to the
families of passenger victims of some commercial air crashes, which
occur during certain types of international air travel, even though
such manufacturers are not negligent,26 whereas airlines which may
be indisputably negligent, may be sheltered from liability except
to the extent of $8,291 for the death or injury of any passenger? In
other words, if a case is worth $1,000,000 and both the airline and
the manufacturer are liable, the airline may pay only $8,291, and the
manufacturer $991,709.
The proposed treaty, with respect to monetary liability, would
also be applicable to airlines only, and not to manufacturers or any
other defendant, including private plane operators and owners, and
even the United States Government. The government remains liable
to passenger victims under the Federal Tort Claims Act27 with re-
25. ICAO Doc. 8865 LC/159, March 16, 1970.
26. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
27. "The District Court ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
[Vol. XX:436
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spect to air crashes from, inter alia, Air Traffic Control error, or in-
adequate weather warnings.
If, as the Circuit Court of Cook County has ruled,28 the damage
and venue limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention are un-
constitutional, the provisions of the Montreal Interim Agreement
should likewise be invalid, and likewise the damage limitation pro-
visions of the proposed Guatemalan Protocol appear to be vulner-
able to constitutional attack.
Under basic constitutional principles, it would appear that air-
lines may not constitutionally agree to impose this $75,000 limita-
tion upon the passenger public by signing a document, inter se. The
approval or disapproval by the Civil Aeronautics Board should not
affect the unconstitutionality of this "agreement." This is not to say
that the Civil Aeronautics Board is not well motivated.
The Montreal Interim Agreement is not a treaty. It is, in reality,
an unofficial amendment, signed by none of the signatory nations to
either the Warsaw Convention or The Hague Protocol, but rather
signed only by certain airlines, and approved by the United States
Civil Aeronautics Board. 9 Except for The Hague Protocol (which
increased nominally the liability of airlines to $16,582), the War-
saw Convention has not been changed by the governments of the
world since 1929. Only those air carriers which are and remain sig-
natories to this Interim Agreement are bound by it. If Czechoslo-
vak Air Lines is permitted to provide regular airline service from
Prague to Chicago and return, the limitation of liability for the fami-
lies of passengers killed while en route from Chicago to Prague would
be $8,291 for any single death, unless Czechoslovak Air Lines is re-
quired to sign the agreement before being permitted to conduct this
international travel. Czechoslovakia is listed as a signatory to the
Warsaw Convention.
Certainly no court would tolerate an agreement of taxicab com-
panies wherein they stipulated among themselves that their liability
for their negligence would be limited to $75,000 per death or injury,
regardless of the extent of damages. One can readily imagine the
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law where the act
or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
28. Supra note 17.
29. C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2, Docket 17325, Agreement C.A.B.
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outcry of bus and truck companies, not to speak of private citizens,
if the taxicab companies of Chicago were to enter into such an agree-
ment, and if the courts were to uphold such a unilateral, self-protec-
tive arrangement.
The Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation met recently in Montreal and decided to recommend a modi-
fication of the Montreal Interim Agreement to provide for a novel
rule of liability. The rule would make the carrier absolutely liable,
regardless of whether or not the carrier was at fault.20 The only ex-
ception to the rule would be where the passenger or person claiming
damages had himself caused or contributed to the accident. The
limit of the air carrier's liability would be raised to $100,000. This
is the proposed Guatemalan Protocol, which was recently approved
by the United States State Department. The United States Senate
has not as yet considered "advising and assenting" concerning this
proposed new treaty.
It is true that citizens of other countries have every right to criti-
cize the present Montreal Interim Agreement, which obviously favors
the American passenger public and requires passengers from other
countries to pay for the preferential treatment acocrded to American
citizens. At least the new treaty treats the world's passenger public
alike. The fallacy, however, of this proposed treaty is that it is
wrongfully assumed that a treaty may constitutionally be imposed
upon the American international air traveling public, which treaty
would insulate commercial airlines against the imposition of other-
wise allowable fair damages, even though the airlines are guilty, not
merely of negligence, but also of wilful or reckless misconduct.
It should be pointed out that, in spite of the various criticisms by
some extravagant authors, amazing safety records have been made
in the last decade since the jet age began. Fatal accidents are
considerably less per passenger mile than twenty years ago, although
there are more and much faster planes. This is a tribute to the
entire aircraft industry and to all governments which are concerned
with aircraft safety.
For example, during 1970, there were approximately 150,000,-
000 travelers upon commercial airlines in the United States alone.
30. I.C.A.O. Doc. 8865 LD/159, March 16, 1970.
450 [Vol. XX:436
1971] PROBLEMS REGARDING AVIATION LITIGATION 451
Yet there was not a single air crash in 1970 involving a single fatality
of a passenger of any scheduled commercial airline within any of the
50 states of the United States, and very few throughout the world.
A person flying from Chicago to Florida via commercial airline is
statistically safer than if he were to drive an automobile for that dis-
tance. However, there were international air accidents, as well as
chartered aircraft disasters. Worldwide, 547 deaths ensued from the
loss of 24 jetliners. When one considers the enormous amount of
air travel, this number of deaths is small in relation to the total num-
ber of passengers, the air miles traveled and from a materialistic
standpoint, the gross receipts of airlines. Insurance premiums con-
stitute a relatively insignificant percentage of airlines' gross receipts.
On January 21, 1971, the 747 superjet marked its first anniversary
in airline service without a single fatality. By then, 100 were being
flown by 18 airlines. They had logged 159,000 hours and 71 mil-
lion miles and had carried about 7 million passengers, which is
equivalent to flying the total population of Ireland from London to
San Francisco. Thus, in its first year, the 747 flew as many miles
and hours as the Boeing 707 flew in its first two years giving the 747
an "unequaled record," according to Richard Sliff, deputy director of
flight standards for the Federal Aviation Administration."' Al-
though the aircraft industry and the governments of the world are
confronted with a serious problem because of vastly increasing air
travel and planes, both commercial and private, the fact remains that
the industry and such governments, to a considerable extent, have
successfully resolved safety problems since the jet age began in 1959.
Why then should there be special legislation at all? There are
companies which daily encounter far greater risks than airlines. Man-
ufacturers of explosives and chemicals, nuclear power plants, opera-
tors of pipe lines, natural gas suppliers, electrical companies, and
many other similar industries can cause an enormous number of
deaths and injuries in a single incident. If there is to be insulation
of one segment of one portion of the industry-the airlines-why
should there not be insulation of the entire aircraft industry, and
likewise the same protection granted to all industry, and for that mat-
ter, all individuals?
31. Chicago Sun Times, Feb. 1, 1971, at 66, col. 1.
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There is no rational basis for having any laws applicable to the
aviation industry which are markedly different from the laws ap-
plicable to individuals, all companies and all entities. Why should
not the airlines' transportation competitors have similar insulation?
Why should bus companies, taxicab operators and railroads be sub-
jected to unlimited liability? Why should an individual be held lia-
ble for unlimited damages if he negligently operates an automobile
on the wrong side of the street and hits a bus which may be carrying
100 businessmen, when his total exposure for this one accident could
be as high as thirty million dollars?
It is fundamental that any legislation or treaty which singles out
any one segment of industry for preferential treatment must have a
"rational basis."32  Accordingly, at the very least, the Warsaw Con-
vention, Hague Protocol, Montreal Interim Agreement and the pro-
posed new treaty, all of which extend markedly and discriminatorily
preferential treatment to airlines, should be subject to serious ques-
tion as to their constitutionality.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION, HAGUE PROTOCOL,
AND MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT
The Warsaw limitation provisions have been held not to apply for
a variey of reasons: (1.) The air carrier was proven guilty of wil-
ful misconduct;33 (2.) tickets were not delivered to the passengers;3 4
and (3.) tickets were delivered to the passengers, but did not contain
proper warning of Warsaw Convention limitations. 5 Accordingly,
it is not always difficult to avoid the damage or venue limitations and
restrictions of the Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol and Montreal
Interim Agreement.
WILFUL MISCONDUCT
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
32. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 197
(1936); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Walters
v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
33. Sand, Air Carrier's Limitations of Liability and Air Passengers' Accident
Compensation Under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 260; KLM v.
Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
34. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382
U.S. 816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Lines, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
35. Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, 390 U.S. 455, reh. den. 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
452 [Vol. XX:436
1971] PROBLEMS REGARDING AVIATION LITIGATION
(1.) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful miscon-
duct.
(2.) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by an agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.3 6
The 1966 Interim Agreement does not change the original provision
of the Warsaw Convention relating to wilful misconduct.
A passenger (or the family of a deceased passenger) may recover
full damages, if proof is made of such wilful misconduct. Wilful
misconduct has been variously defined. Article 25 of the Conven-
tion states that the definition of wilful misconduct shall be in accord
with the law of the forum. This has been held to mean gross neg-
ligence or an utter disregard of consequences from known danger.3
7
Proof of wilful misconduct is not nearly as difficult as it might ap-
pear. It is obvious, but true, that an airplane cannot pull over to
the side of the road, and that when it encounters adverse weather
or mechanical problems and a crash takes place, the results are almost
always disastrous. Courts have imposed liability in automobile
cases, by analogy to guest cases, which require proof or wilful mis-
conduct in a wide variety of situations: (a.) Striking a guardrail;3 8
(b.) speeding;39 (c.) operator falling asleep;4" (d.) drunkenness;41
(e.) failure to obey traffic signs;42 (f.) distraction of driver's atten-
tion; 43 (g.) driving without headlights. 44
In the case of Turner v. Ovall,45 the Illinois Appellate Court held
that evidence that an automobile left the pavement, traveled 150 feet,
hit a railing and became airborne for 30 to 35 feet, was sufficient for
36. 49 Stat. 3000, 3020, 3015 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective October 29, 1934).
37. K.L.M. v. Tuller, 292 F2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Wilful Mis-
conduct under the Warsaw Convention, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1965).
38. Turner v. Ovall, - Ill. App. 2d -, 264 N.E.2d 839 (1970).
39. Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952); Smith v. Prater, 206
Va. 693, 146 S.E.2d 179 (1966).
40. Flynn v. Hurley, 332 Mass. 182, 124 N.E.2d 810 (1955); Smith v. Williams,
180 Or. 626, 178 P.2d 710 (1947).
41. Meade v. Meade, 206 Va. 823, 147 S.E.2d 171 (1966).
42. Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So. 2d 565 (1942).
43. Biedron v. Quincannon, 126 Ill. App. 2d 283, 262 N.E.2d 71 (1970).
44. Cornelison v. Logan, 253 Ala. 618, 46 So. 2d 215 (1950).
45. Supra note 38.
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the jury on the issue of driver's wilful and wanton misconduct. The
defendant owner of the automobile and another passenger were
killed, plaintiff was the only survivor, and there was no eyewitness
testimony to the occurrence events. Therefore, there could be no
affirmative testimony as to the actual conduct of the driver of the car.
Testimony as to the occurrence was presented by a state trooper who
investigated the accident, a reconstruction expert, and the occupant
of a car going in the opposite direction who did not see the actual oc-
currence, but saw only that the car was airborne for from 30 to 35
feet. The court pointed out that the only evidence presented was
of the gyrations that the automobile took.
The court stated:
The evidence here presented and the inferences of wilful and wanton misconduct
which may properly be drawn from the circumstances on the issue of wilful and
wanton misconduct have evidentiary support within the rule of Larson. The trial
court correctly let that issue go to the jury and properly denied a directed verdict
and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.4 6
The court therefore upheld the trial court's finding that there was
sufficient evidence to warrant submitting the issue of wilful and
wanton misconduct to the jury. If the courts are willing to uphold
a finding of wilful misconduct against an automobile operator who
unexplainedly operates his automobile into a guardrail, causing in-
juries or death to a guest passenger, the analogy to aviation disas-
ters is self-evident: If an aircraft crashes into a mountain or into the
terrain short of a runway, and the airline cannot explain this self-evi-
dent wilful misconduct, a court or jury should be entitled to assess
unlimited damages in favor of passenger victims or their families in
accordance with Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention.17
It should further be noted that if a crash takes place during in-
ternational air travel to which the Warsaw Convention or Montreal
Interim Agreement is applicable, Article 17 of the Convention creates
a cause of action.4 To be explicit, if attorney Williams, who was
flying from Rome to Athens, was killed due to the wilful misconduct
of the airline, or if his ticket did not contain adequate notice of the
applicable treaty limitations, his family would be entitled to recover
46. Supra note 38, at -, 264 N.E.2d at 841; Larsen v. Harris, 38 Ill. 2d 436,
231 N.E.2d 421 (1967).
47. 49 Stat. 3000, 3020, 3015 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective October 29,
1934).
48. Id., at 3018.
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pecuniary damages, not limited by any statutory or positive law of
the place of the occurrence, nor of his or his family's place of para-
mount interest, or center of gravity. In other words, the Warsaw
Convention Treaty and similar treaties provide for damages within
the treaties themselves, but limit those damages if the airline was
merely negligent and if the airline saw to it that appropriate tickets
containing explicit warning were delivered in ample time.
It is significant that in relation to the case of Lisi v. Alitalia Air
Lines49 the appellant, Alitalia Airlines, and the intervening amicus
curiae, the United Kingdom, both unequivocally stated that the
effect of the Lisi decision was that, in the event of the death of a
passenger during international travel to which the Warsaw Conven-
tion is applicable, there is no restriction of liability if the Warsaw
Convention limitation provisions do not apply because of wilful mis-
conduct, or non-delivery of, or inadequate, tickets. The United
Kingdom's brief in the United States Supreme Court stated:
The provision which the court below would read into Article 3(1) of the Con-
vention is contrary to the position taken by the United States at the Hague Confer-
ence in 1955, that the sanction of unlimited liability does not apply "it the ticket
does not include the notice required by paragraph 1(c) of this Article . 50
Alitalia Airlines' counsel stated in its petition:
Article 3(2) of the Convention, in plain, simple, concise language, imposes upon
a carrier the severe and unusual penalty of absolute liability for personal injury or
death of its passengers, and without limitation as to damages, "if the carrier accepts
a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered." 5 1
One well-known defense counsel has recently stated:
Finally, if you can convince an American court, which should not prove too dif-
ficult, that you did not receive adequate notice of the application of the limitation
of liability which the court ultimately determines was applicable to your transporta-
tion, the court will probably rule that the limitation does not apply to you. Or,
a passenger faced with the CAB 18900 limitation of liability defense might be able
to convince an American court that this is not a binding agreement on the passenger,
since it constitutes nothing more than a unilateral declaration by the CAB 18900
carrier that he will accept liability up to a limit of $75,000 per passenger. Having
thus eliminated the Warsaw/Hague/CAB 18900 limitation of liability, the court will
undoubtedly go on to rule that the carrier is deprived of any opportunity of over-
49. Supra note 35.
50. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S 455 (1968), Motion
for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief for the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, p. 8, filed Dec. 26, 1967 (emphasis added).
51. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (emphasis
supplied). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, p. 8, filed Mar. 20, 1967.
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coming the liability created by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The situation
in this case is that the carrier is absolutely liable for damages unlimited in amount.
This, of course, is the net result of the Lisi case.5 2
Suppose, for example, that attorney Williams in example (c) were
from Missouri, which has a $50,000 statutory limitation in reference
to wrongful death, and suppose further that Greece has a limitation
of liability, imposed by its positive law, in the sum of $25,000.
Neither limitation would apply, because Article 17 of the Warsaw
Treaty manifestly creates liability for damages in the event of death
or injury, unaffected by any other law:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or
in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 53
NON-DELIVERY OF TICKETS
Article 3 of the Convention provides that the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket and that
[ilf the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been de-
livered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the conven-
tion which exclude or limit liability.54
There are occasions when tickets are not delivered to passengers at
any time at all, or, if delivered, the delivery takes place after the
passenger is aboard. In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,55 the
passenger was given a "boarding ticket" or "pass" at the foot of the
ramp leading to the aircraft. The court decided that the "delivery"
must be made sufficiently in advance so that the passenger will have
the opportunity to take self-protective measures, such as purchasing
additional insurance if he so chooses. The "delivery" of a boarding
ticket at the foot of the ramp as the plane was about to depart did
not suffice. The carrier, accordingly, was barred by Article 3(2)
from availing itself of the Convention's liability limitations.
THE TICKET MUST CONTAIN SUFFICIENT WARNING
Article 3 of the Convention relating to passengers, provides that
52. Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. AIR L. &
COM. 387 (1970) (emphasis added).
53 49 Stat. 3000, 3018 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective October 29, 1934).
54. Id., at 3015.
55. Supra note 34.
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the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the following
particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places... ;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) .A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to lia-
bility established by this convention. 5 6
In Lisi, the court held that the notice requirements of the Warsaw
Convention were not met by language, contained on an airline ticket,
which was "ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unem-
phasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else."57
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals quoted with approval from
the district court's finding that the notice contained on an airline
ticket was insufficient to bind the passenger. "Moreover, even if a
passenger were able to read the printing on the ticket and baggage
check, it is highly questionable whether he would be able to under-
stand the meaning of the language contained thereon."5 8
By analogy, the venue provisions of Article 28,59 which purport
to restrict the places of suit, may not be available to the airline unless
the ticket was delivered in apt time, and the ticket warned the passen-
ger of these additional restrictive venue provisions. The Warsaw Con-
vention expressly provides that the provisions of the treaty which "ex-
clude or limit" liability of the airline are not applicable if a ticket
has not been delivered to a passenger. Article 3 of the Convention
states: "if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his lia-
bility." 60
SUMMARY
THE ABSURD EFFECTS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION, HAGUE
PROTOCOL, AND MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT,
AS WELL AS THE PROPOSED NEW TREATY
Let us take example (a.). The pecuniary loss, not to speak of
56. 49 Stat. 3000, 3015 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective October 29, 1934).
57. Supra note 35, 370 F.2d at 514. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aft'd 390
U.S. 455 (1968).
58. Supra note 35, at 514 n.10.
59. 49 Stat. 3000, 3023 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective October 29, 1934).
60. Id., at 3015.
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loss of parental care and guidance and other elements of damage re-
sulting from the death of Judge Jones while flying from Chicago to
London, is at least $600,000. Yet the effect of the Montreal In-
terim Agreement, entered into by the airlines as a supposed amend-
ment to (or, at least, change in) the Warsaw Convention, may be
to limit Judge Jones' widow and five minor children to less than two
years of earnings. Why? Because, in 1934, the Senate of the United
States specifically approved the Warsaw Convention, without debate,
as a result of a voice vote (contrary to Senate procedures-which
prohibit a voice vote for ratification of treaties), and because, in
1966, certain airlines got together and decided among themselves to
increase their limit of damages to $75,000 with reference to any
international travel having a contact with the United States.
At the outset, I would like to say that I never could see any basis
for the Montreal Agreement. The granting of preferential treatment
to international air passengers, simply because of the illogical and
irrational determinant that they intend to stop in the United States,
never made any sense to me. If an airplane en route from Rome to
Paris to the United States crashes in Paris, I cannot perceive why
some passengers, usually American citizens who boarded in Rome,
should be preferred simply because they intended to fly on to the
United States, while passengers who intended to disembark in Paris
should be discriminated against. The limitation of liability enacted
by treaties in favor only of airlines results in gross injustices, and, in
my opinion, the unconstitutional denial of due process of law to air-
craft manufacturers, component part suppliers, the United States
Government and all other defendants, none of whom enjoys any such
preferential treatment for their own negligence.
It seems somewhat presumptuous for air carriers to insulate them-
selves, at the expense of their suppliers. What do British Aircraft
Corporation, Sud Aviation, Boeing Company, Lockheed Aircraft
Company, General Dynamics Corporation, General Motors Corpora-
tion, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, United Aircraft Com-
pany and General Electric Company, to name but a few end prod-
uct manufacturers, have to say about the Warsaw Convention Treaty,
Hague Protocol, Montreal Interim Agreement or this proposed Guat-
amalan treaty? Are not their executives and attorneys concerned
that they will remain subjected to unlimited exposure to damages un-
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der the doctrine of strict liability, even though they are not negligent
at all, whereas airlines are and will remain immunized from liability?
According to the World Aviation Directory,6' there are approxi-
mately 25,000 manufacturers and component-part makers involved in
the production of aircraft. Aren't the executives of and attorneys for
these 25,000 manufacturers worried?
What about the United States Government? The United States
Government is fully responsible for unlimited damages if its air traf-
fic controllers or other government personnel are negligent.62
As to example (b.) in which attorney Smith was rendered a quad-
raplegic while flying from Des Moines to London via Chicago, courts
have held that he is engaged in "international travel." Another pas-
senger, on the same airplane, and paying the same fare, also en
route to London, but who intends to buy a separate ticket from Chi-
cago to London,63 could recover full damages without limitation
against the negligent airline.
In other words, a person can be flying in "international air travel"
even though, in fact, he is flying domestically. This is the result of
early reactionary decisions which interpreted the Warsaw Conven-
tion so as to limit the damages of persons flying domestically (but
whose ultimate ticketed destination was another country) to $8,291,
even though the occurrence would take place within the United States
upon a purely domestic airline.
As to example (c.) involving attorney Williams, who was killed
while flying from Rome to Athens, the law is even more indefensible.
Most people who fly to Europe visit the total Continent, just as per-
sons who fly to the United States generally do not confine their trip
to a single city. Europe, like the United States, contains many
cities which are attractive to visitors. Changing weather is one fac-
tor which motivates Americans who are visiting Europe to travel
from one city to another. But few, if any, lawyers or laymen are
familiar with the pitfalls which exist if they are killed while flying in
Europe, not only regarding the severe restriction of recoverable dam-
ages against admittedly negligent airlines, but also the possible un-
61. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., No. 61 (1970).
62. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
63. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. American Airlines, 43 Misc. 2d 856,
252 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1964).
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collectability of routine air-trip insurance policies which they might
purchase at airports before departure.
In the case of attorney Williams, it must be remembered that he
decided to fly from London to Rome, and, while in Rome, from
Rome to Athens. Therefore, he would have purchased a new ticket
in Rome to go to Athens. Accordingly, his existing ticketing would
not have involved a "contact" with the United States, and thus his
Rome-Athens trip would not come within the purview of the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement.64 Inasmuch as Italy and Greece are signa-
tories to the Hague Protocol, the recoverable damages of attorney
Williams' family against the admittedly negligent airline may be
limited to $16,600. This is the limitation of liability prescribed by
the Protocol.
What about the policy of insurance which Mr. Williams purchased
to protect his wife and children? The machines at the airport which
may be used to purchase this insurance contain a space which requires
the applicant to write his name, the names and addresses of his
designated beneficiaries, and his "point of departure" and his "desti-
nation." When Mr. Williams purchased his hypothetical policy,
his then-existing ticket provided for a trip to London. Of course, he
had in the back of his mind, as would anyone, that he might fly from
London to Paris, to Rome, to Athens or any number of easily ac-
cessible cities-just as a European visitor to the United States might
purchase a ticket to fly to Chicago, with the intention of possibly fly-
ing from Chicago to New York, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington,
Minneapolis, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Dallas, or similar cities.
Yet in the fine print of these policies there are exclusionary provi-
sions which some courts, believe it or not, have upheld-even though
a person does not even get an extra copy of the policy, does not read
it, and mails it, for obvious purposes, immediately to his family.
Certainly no one would carry the policy aboard the plane and study it,
because if the plane crashed, his family would not know that he had
even purchased the policy.
The insurance companies adroitly limit the space on the ma-
chines. There is no space to insert particular trips or the details of
64. C.A.B. Order No. E. 23680, at 2, Docket 17325, Agreement C.A.B.
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various other portions of the total voyage, which might be ar-
ranged before or after the purchase of the policy. The application
limits the information required simply to "point of departure" and
"destination." The application does not require the listing of and
does not even contain the space for all contemplated possible voyages
or trips which are to be taken by the insured within the time limit of
the policy. The extent of ticketed mileage has no relationship what-
ever to premium cost. Nowhere in the capitalized printing is there
any warning to the effect that if the purchaser carries out an addi-
tional or side trip, the policy is inapplicable.
The gist of the exclusionary clause is that the policy does not cover
those trips which are arranged after the insured physically leaves the
airport. In other words, if attorney Williams, after depositing his
coins in the machine, went over to a counter and purchased addi-
tional tickets from London to Rome to Athens, the policy would
cover the flights. The same is true as to the sales girls. Yet if he
purchased his ticket in London, rather than in Chicago, 24 or 48
hours later, the policy would not apply. Needless to say, the insur-
ance company is totally unaware of the changed itinerary until af-
ter Mr. Williams is dead. Only then will an insurance company in-
vestigate the place of the purchase of the tickets; and if it finds that
the tickets for the new passage were purchased after initial depar-
ture, rather than before initial departure, it will refuse to pay.
Thus, Mrs. Williams and her 5 minor children, will get nothing,
simply because her husband purchased his tickets for the trip from
London to Rome, and from Rome to Athens, a few days after leav-
ing O'Hare Field. Obviously these tricky, camouflaged and un-
conscionable exclusionary clauses in policies of air trip insurance
(whether supplied by machines or sales girls) affect hundreds of
millions of American international air travelers.
A recent article by Robert L. Jackson focused upon this problem:
' Today's air passenger may buy a $15,000 flight-insurance policy for 50 cents
and board his airplane without second thoughts about the price. But this casual
insurance buyer, whose numbers are legion this summer, is feeding a multimillion
dollar program that mainly enriches airport terminals and insurance companies,
according to government investigations.
The payout on air travel insurance is extremely low, they have found. Only 26
per cent of the premiums collected over eight years have been paid out in benefits
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by insurance companies. The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion are looking into the matter.6 5
Many passengers seek to protect the financial well-being of their
families through the purchase of Airline Trip Insurance. In spite of
the good faith efforts of attorney Williams to protect Mrs. Williams
and his 5 small children, his intentions are thwarted by hypertechni-
cal, exclusionary language buried in a policy of approximately
2,000 words, often containing sentences of over 150 words. It
should be kept in mind that the premium has no relationship to the
length or extent of the proposed trip or trips. It costs exactly the
same amount to purchase air trip insurance whether a traveler in-
tends to fly around the world or fly 100 miles. Nonetheless, the
United States Court of Appeals has upheld the validity of this type
of contract applied to a housewife with 5 small children, 6 let alone
a lawyer.
DOMESTIC DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
Laymen, not attuned to the indefensible vagaries in the law, would
regard the inequalities and injustices concerning awards for injury or
death in aviation cases as stranger than fiction. There are many
vastly different laws which can determine damages applicable to the
survivors of air crash victims. Peculiarly, the damages which may
be recoverable by the survivors of victims of a single commercial air
crash may vary substantially, even though the victimized passengers
are flying upon the same aircraft, paying the same fare, and can prove
the same amount of loss.
Basically, there are two principles which determine the amount
of damages in respect to domestic accidents: (a.) One doctrine,
lex loci delicti, requires the court to assess damages in accordinace
with the law of the place of the accident; (b.) the other doctrine, the
law of "paramount interest," also known as "grouping of contacts"
or "center of gravity," requires the court to assess damages in accord-
ance with the law of the place of "paramount interest" applicable to
each particular passenger. These basic concepts, or one of them,
have been employed by United States courts in selecting the cri-
65. Federal agencies taking hard look at low-payout air-trip policies, Chicago
Sun Times, July 13, 1970, at 58, col. 1.
66. Fakhri v. The Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 428 F.2d
499 (7th Cir. 1970).
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teria of damages applicable to a given case. Each of the fifty
states has a statute regarding damages for wrongful death. For-
ty-one states have no limitation of damages; nine states retain a
statutory wrongful death limit.67
Much of the confusion concerning the law relating to damages for
wrongfully inflicted death arises from the erroneous common law con-
cept, inherited from English law, that there is no cause of action for
wrongful death unless there exists a specific enabling statute. Be-
cause of this fallacious premise, courts have resorted to plausible de-
terminants to reach preordained conclusions, in order to provide a
semblance of justice for wrongful death. However, attempts of these
commendably socially-oriented judges, while praise-worthy, result in
only partially distributed justice. In other words, the "paramount
interest" doctrine alone not only does not solve the problem, but can
increase it.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have
come finally to grips with the problem. It would appear that Mor-
agne v. States Marine Lines6" has rejected, once and for all, the
English common law rule denying civil action for wrongful death. It
is therein stated:
Our analysis of the history of the common law rule indicates that it was based
on a particular set of factors that had, when The Harrisburg was decided, long since
been thrown into discard even in England, and that had never existed in this
country at all.
Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable
if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation
should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death. On
the contrary, that rule has been criticized ever since its inception, and described in
such terms as "barbarous." 6 9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has already embraced this deci-
sion, stating: "There is now a cause of action for wrongful death in
admiralty that is not dependent on adjacent state law."' 70  Another
court has stated:
The substance of Moragne is simply that the United States Supreme Court has
67. Only nine states retain a statutory wrongful death limit: Kansas, $35,000;
Massachusetts, $50,000; Minnesota, $35,000; Missouri, $50,000; New Hampshire,
$60,000; Oregon, $25,000; Virginia, $50,000; West Virginia, $110,000; and Wis-
consin, $35,500.
68. Supra note 18.
69. Supra note 18, at 381.
70. Supra note 19, at 867.
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now unanimously held that there is a cause of action for wrongful death apart from
statute. Although that case did not involve a death upon the high seas, the court
squarely overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), and later decisions follow-
ing The Harrisburg, which in effect followed the alleged common law rule that there
is no civil action for wrongful death in the absence of statute. The obvious effect
of Moragne is that there is a common law action for any wrongful death against
any wrongdoer, whether the death occurs in water or on land. It would be the
height of absurdity if the families of wrongfully killed persons could recover full
and fair damages if the deaths occurred in water, but could not recover similar
damages if the deaths occurred on land. A moment's reflection will demonstrate
the incongruousness of such a ruling. If a plane were to crash and some of the
victims were to land in a lake and some upon land (such as in Wisconsin), it would
be a peculiar law if the families of those victims who fell into water and were
drowned could recover twenty or thirty times more than the families of those who
were killed by falling onto land. This court can hardly believe that the sole
criterion of determination of damages is going to be determined by whether the
victim was killed on land or water.
7 1
There is some disagreement as to the meaning of Moragne, although
the language of the decision is clear enough. It is enough to say
that, although the use of the "grouping of contacts" or "paramount
interest" doctrine succeeds in the granting of fair damages in some
cases, it does not provide a universally satisfactory solution.72 Judges
who believe that they will achieve solutions by rejecting the tradi-
tional lex loci delicti principle in favor of the "more modern", "cen-
ter of gravity," or "grouping of contacts" principles regretfully are
mistaken. For example, if the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court
of Oregon has lunch with the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of
New York, in New York, and both are killed while riding as passen-
gers in a taxicab due to the negligence of the operator, what are the
rights of the families of each Judge? The strict application of the
"center of gravity" or "paramount interest" doctrine espoused by the
Restatement, would impose a limitation of liability as to the family of
the Oregon Judge in the amount of $25,000.00, whereas, of course,
the family of the New York Judge could recover fair damages, con-
sistent with his earning potential and pecuniary losses, which could
well be in excess of $500,000. 73 On the other hand, if the Oregon
Judge were killed in Illinois, the Illinois courts would not apply the
"paramount interest" doctrine, but probably would apply Illinois law
71. Leroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 11 Avi. 17, 919 (Ill. Cir. Cook Co. 1970).
72. KENNELLY, II LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, ch. 6 (1968).
73. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); RESTATEMENT
SECOND, CONFLICTS OF LAW, § 322(b) (1969); Reese, Conflicts of Law and the
Restatement, Second, 28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 679 (1963).
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which does not limit damages.74
The mechanical application of the new remedy might prove to be
worse than the sickness.75 Professor Cavers emphasized the content
of the law to be applied as being most significant in the choice of
law as against overriding geographic factors. 71
Professor Leflar develops five major "choice-influencing consider-
ations" within which "all or most of the factors that ordinarily affect
choice-of-law decisions can be incorporated. 77  These factors, which
are remarkably similar in concept to the Restatement view, are:
(a.) predictability of results; (b.) maintenance of interstate and in-
ternational order; (c.) simplification of the judicial task; (d.) ad-
vancement of the forum's governmental interest; and (e.) application
of the better rule of law.
Courts which attempt to adhere too strictly to an indiscriminate ap-
plication of the "most significant contacts" rule place themselves in
an inextricable straitjacket so that they must blindly follow a rigid
formula, unattuned to reality, contrary to common sense, and result-
ing in harsh and oppressive results. The goal of courts to achieve
a consistent formula in order to achieve reasonable predictablity is
obtainable by adopting a choice of laws doctrine which enables the
forum court to employ either lex loci deliciti or center of gravity, in
order to achieve fair results. 78
The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated the matter simply:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases just as is done in
nonconflicts cases, when the choice is open to us. If the law of some other state
is outmoded, an unrepealed remnant of a bygone age, "a drag on the coattails of
civilization," we will try to see our way clear to apply our own law instead. If
it is our own law that is obsolete or senseless (and it could be) we will try to apply
the other state's law. Courts have always done this in conflict cases, but have
usually covered up what they have done by employing manipulative techniques
such as characterization and renvoi.7 9
74. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 111. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970).
75. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Lost Appeal for Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965).
76. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 9 (1965). See also CURRIE, SE-
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 165 (1963).
77. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
78. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 267, 282-304 (1966).
79. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
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Now the Wisconsin Supreme Court also has adopted the "better rule
of law" in conflict of laws cases:
We emphasize that we prefer the Wisconsin rule of ordinary negligence not be-
cause it is Wisconsin's law, but because we consider it to be the better law.
In three cases within a year, Heath, Zelinger, and this case, we have preferred
Wisconsin law, but it should be noted that the merits of the competing rules of
law were carefully considered, and the choice was made not as a matter of
parochial preference but in the honest belief that, given the opportunity to apply
either a forum or nonforum law, the better law in each case proved to be that
of the forum.8
0
It should be pointed out that even the "better law" rule will not
achieve simple fairness. This is particularly true with respect to
major aviation disasters. Each passenger pays the same considera-
tion. It seems indefensible to limit the damages of the family of one
passenger and not to limit the damages of the family of the passenger
sitting next to him, simply because the latter passenger's center of
gravity is a "non-limit" state. What happens if the occurrence takes
place in a limit state and the passenger's center of gravity is also a
limit state? Suppose a commercial aircraft crashes in Oregon, car-
rying 200 lawyers. The death of a lawyer, age 40, earning $50,-
000.00 a year, leaving surviving a widow and five minor children, in-
volves pecuniary losses which could well exceed one million dollars,
considering the potential contributions. Suppose 100 of the law-
yers are from Missouri and 100 from Illinois. Illinois would reject
the Oregon limitation. Thus, the families of the Illinois lawyers
could recover substantial damages. The families of Missouri law-
yers, on the other hand, might recover only limited damages.
Suppose, for the sake of example, there were twin brothers on the
same aircraft, each of whom had a wife and five children and each of
whom was earning $50,000.00 per year. One was from Missouri,
the other from Illinois. They boarded the plane together in Chicago
and were killed in the air crash in Oregon, due to the negligence of
the airline. The family of the Illinois lawyer could recover possibly one
million dollars. 81 The family of the Missouri lawyer would be lim-
ited to either $25,000.00 (the law of Oregon) or $50,000.00 (the
law of Missouri). The foregoing and many similar examples could
be supplied to prove that the only way in which simple justice can
80. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 586-87 (1968).
81. Supra note 74.
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be applied in this type of litigation is for the courts to reject statutory
or treaty-imposed limitations of damages for wrongful death.
As pointed out by Professor Arthur John Keeffe,
The basic difficulty in these cases is that we are still laboring under the delusion
that an American personal representative, whose deceased is wrongfully killed,
needs Lord Campbell to permit our courts to entertain the action against the
wrongdoer. Can this be any longer true?
As far as I have been able to discover, a complete misunderstanding has existed
in the American courts on this subject for too many years.
The common law revolved around a single precept: Fore very injury, a remedy.
The right of a widow to recover for the wrongful killing of her husband was
recognized in ancient days. 8 2
The courts have always recognized that the law is neither static nor
sterile, and should be a living thing, responsive to the needs of so-
ciety and the moral sense of the community.
Apart from Moragne there is precedent which reveals that actions
for wrongful death did exist in the early law of England.8" At early
common law, the dependent family of a victim, wrongfully killed,
did possess an enforceable claim for damages. In 1808, Lord Ellen-
borough repudiated this early common law, in his infamous nisi
prius dictum, in which he denied any recovery to the husband of a
woman who was negligently injured and killed in a stagecoach acci-
dent. Ten years later, this same Lord Ellenborough said that the
family of a wrongfully killed victim, in order to obtain redress, must
obtain it from the wrongdoer by beating him physically (trial by bat-
tle). That was the concept of "justice" of Lord Ellenborough,
whom Imlah in his biography described as "moulded to the Tory
point of view," who "attached excessive importance to penal methods
of defending property and privilege." '84
The opinion of Lord Ellenborough, a judge described by Prosser
as one "whose forte was never common sense,' 85 has received wide-
spread criticism as unsound, unjust, erroneous, and unsupported by
precedent. Yet, that opinion remains, except for Moragne, as the
underlying premise for the almost unbelievably conflicting and inde-
fensible laws relating to damages which are demonstrably absurd,
particularly in aviation disasters. What possible legally justifiable
82. Keeffe, Book Review, 48 A.B.A.J. 877 (1962).
83. IMLAH, LoRD ELLENBOROUGH 6 (1939).
84. Id.
85. PROSSER, TORTS 709 (2d ed. 1955).
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explanation can there be for the incongruous state of the law, which
in certain instances would permit, for example, a millionaire owner
of a racehorse to collect upwards of two million dollars for its negli-
gently caused death, but would restrict the widow and children of an
innocently killed husband, father and wage-earner, the driver of the
truck in which the racehorse was being transported, to $25,000.00,
simply because the accident happended in Oregon and the truck driver
and his family lived in that state? It is suggested that no legisla-
ture ever had or now has any right to deny to its citizens equal pro-
tection or due process of law through the passage of statutes which
limit the damages of survivors of an airplane disaster or any accident
to an arbitrarily restricted sum, regardless of undisputed proof of
much greater damage.
Attempts to solve the problems which result from fifty different
damage laws in fifty different states, through the utilization of either
traditional rules or newly composed principles (such as "center of
gravity" or "place of most significant contacts"), have met with some
success, but gross injustices remain. The simple fact is that stage-
coach-era legal principles are not adaptable to the jet age.
In any event, it now seems abundantly clear that the Supreme
Court of the United States, by its unanimous decision, has laid to rest,
once and for all, the indefensible limitations of damages, the absurdity
of which is particularly pointed up in commercial airplane disasters.8 6
The effect of this decision is that any statute which restricts damages
for wrongful death is unconstitutional.
A problem not yet decided by any court is whether the judge or
the jury determines the ultimate issue of the place of "center of grav-
ity," or "place of most signiifcant contacts." This issue may be the
only genuine fact issue in an aviation case. If the state where the
injury occurs is not disputed, and that state has a statutory limit, the
only debatable issue may be what is the place of "most significant
contacts" applicable to the particular case. Inasmuch as the de-
termination of this ultimate fact issue can be decisive, and can de-
lineate the rights of the families of passenger victims, it is my belief
that under basic jury law the resolution of this issue should be for the
jury, under appropriate instructions. The only exception would
86. Supra note 18.
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be when there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the "place of
most significant contacts," as is the rule in any case where there is
no factual issue.
CONCLUSION
With respect to international air travel, the net effect of the War-
saw Convention, The Hague Protocol, the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment of 1966, and the proposed new treaty is that commercial air-
lines alone receive preferential status, as opposed not only to their
competitors (railroads, bus companies, etc.), but also in relation to
other segments of the aircraft industry, as well as individuals. A
private aircraft owner or operator is fully liable for his negligence.
He receives no preferential discrimination. A private aircraft man-
ufacturer is fully liable for its negligence. It receives no preferen-
tial discrimination. Commercial aircraft manufacturers are fully lia-
ble for their negligence. They receive no preferential discrimina-
tion. The Government is fully liable for its negligence. It receives
no preferential discrimination.
Entirely apart from aviation, all corporations, companies, partner-
ships or individuals in the United States, regardless of their type of
business, are fully liable for their negligence. They receive no pre-
ferential discrimination.
The sole beneficiaries of discriminatory treaties (Warsaw Con-
vention and The Hague Protocol), and the Montreal Interim Agree-
ment, as well as the proposed new treaty, are commercial airlines.
The law relating to international travel has become so complicated
that a computer has been devised to determine what law applies, de-
pending on the point of origin and destination of the air traveler.8 7
With respect to domestic air crashes, attempts to explain on
any logical basis the conflicts in the law relating to the conflict of
the laws concerning damages is like trying to tattoo soap bubbles.
One of the faults of the legal profession is that we are inclined to en-
graft upon pre-existing rules, however archaic and outmoded they
might be, in an attempt to prescribe some degree of "reason" based
upon precedent, in order to conform the law to modern society
and its needs. One thinks of Emerson's "foolish consistency."
87. 35 J. AIR L. & COMM. 249 (1969).
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The law has even reached such absurdities, in regard to conflict of
laws, that the rights of families of innocent victims of a negligently
caused air crash, in which the airplane crashes into water, may de-
pend on whether there was salt in the water. For example, if a
plane crashes into water which is defined as the "high seas" (the
oceans of the world), the rights of the families of victims are sup-
posedly determined by the statute known as the "Death on the High
Seas Act."88
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
problem. The substance and effect of the Moragne decision, ac-
cording to a recent opinion,"0 is simply that
Moragne definitely creates a cause of action for wrongful death, independently
of any legislation.
This court agreed with the philosophy expressed in Moragne, i.e., that the
supposed common law rule that there was no action at all for wrongful death, in the
absence of a statute, was and is invalid. The corollary of this is obvious. If the
common law permits a cause of action for wrongful death, then enabling statutes
are not needed, because plaintiffs who suffer damages by reason of wrongfully in-
flicted deaths may recover damages apart from any statute.90
Therefore, we may have reached the light at the end of the tunnel. In-
stead of courts employing conflict of laws principles, in an attempt
to avoid the harshness of statutorily imposed limitations for wrong-
ful death, the simple answer is that the courts of this country are not
so constricted that they may not take appropriate action to provide
simple and expedient justice for the families of passengers who may
be wrongfully killed in the crash of airplanes. This can be brought
about only if the courts recognize that any unreasonable limita-
tion for wrongful death, arbitrarily imposed by any state, is not
valid. Although the Moragne decision involved an admiralty case,
its language is clear and unquestionable, and should lay to rest once
and for all any statutorily imposed limitations upon the recovery of
fair damages for negligently caused deaths. Moragne leads inexor-
ably to the conclusion that a statute is not needed in order for a
court to grant full and fair damages, without limitation, for any
wrongful death which occurs within or over not only inland waters,
but on or over land. Otherwise, the courts would be defending an
88. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964). See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893
(7th Cir. 1967).
89. Supra note 71.
90. Supra note 71, at 17,922.
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indefensible hiatus in the law. How could the courts justify granting
full damages to the family of a victim who dies in water, but limit
damages to the family of a victim who dies on land? If a plane
crashes, for example, in Wisconsin on the shores of Lake Michigan,
are the courts to apply different standards of recovery to the families
of victims of the same airplane, based upon whether passengers died
in the lake or on the beach? Are the families of victims who die on
the beach to be limited to $32,500 (the Wisconsin limitation), based
upon lex loci delicti, or restricted to such limitations as may be pre-
scribed by their respective states of "paramount interest" if the latter
choice of laws doctrine is applied by the forum. Is a passenger who
is dying on the beach, following a crash, supposed to crawl into the
water to die so that his family will receive fair compensation, rather
than $32,500 or some other arbitrarily limited amount?
This is but one brief example of the incongruous state of the law
regarding damages in wrongful death cases, which incongruity finds
its greatest expression in aviation disasters.
The only remedy is for the courts to have the fortitude and
sound thinking to stop defending a poor position which is based
upon an 1808 lower court English decision, consisting of one-half of
one page, which cited no precedent, but which "ruled" that there is
no cause of action at the common law for wrongful death.
The courts, seeking to rectify the many unjust results which ema-
nate from this 1808 decision, Baker v. Bolton, have employed vari-
ous doctrines including principally the "paramount interest" rule,
sometimes also known as the "center of gravity" principle. But this
new rule simply does not achieve even a semblance of justice in
many cases. Some lawyers and judges believe that the United
States Supreme Court decision in Moragne really holds, in ultimate
analysis, that there is a cause of action at the common law for
wrongful death, regardless of whether the occurrence takes place on
land or in navigable water. Surely, the United States Supreme
Court could not have intended that the families of those who "for-
tuitously" are killed in water are to receive fifty or more times as
much as those families of passengers on the same plane who happen
to die on land. This could happen if a large jetliner were to come
apart in the air because the bodies could, of course, land many miles
apart.
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Generally, it should be stated that attempts to engraft upon ex-
isting law have led and are leading the legal profession from confu-
sion to chaos. The proposed Guatemalan Protocol is nothing but
an amendment to the Warsaw Convention. The effect of the Guate-
malan Protocol is to relieve airlines of liability for death or injury,
over $100,000, even if the airline is not merely negligent, but guilty
of recklessness and wilful and wanton misconduct. The Warsaw
Convention Treaty was drafted in 1929 when there was no liability
of either manufacturers or the United States Government. Now,
manufacturers are liable, not only for their negligence, but even
apart from negligence, if they manufacture an unsafe product. The
Government is liable for its negligence under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. Neither manufacturers nor the United States Government, nor
for that matter, any potential defendant in an aviation disaster, is
insulated or protected in any manner from the imposition of full
damages.
There is no constitutional basis for any treaty or statute which
would single out one segment of one industry and grant to that one
segment enormous preferential treatment, at the expense of other
members of the same industry, not to speak of the United States
Government and the general public.
472 [Vol. XX:436










On March 8 a Protocol to the Warsaw Convention was adopted at an in-
ternational conference held at Guatemala City. The United States and
twenty other countries signed the Protocol. I believe you will be in-
terested in the substantive decisions which were reached at the conference,
which are reflected in the attached copy of the Protocol.
In dealing with the rights, obligations and liabilities of carriers providing
international air transportation, the Protocol contains features that we be-
lieve are important not only because they offer a solution to the specific
problem of the inadequacy of the existing limit of liability of a carrier to
its passenger, but also because they represent a new approach to recon-
ciling the conflicts that exist in various states between national and inter-
national treatment of this problem of liability of the carrier to its passen-
gers.
At present, air carrier liability may be governed by one of three different
systems on flights that are "international carriage" within the meaning of
the Warsaw Convention: (1) the Warsaw Convention, (2) the Hague Pro-
tocol, or (3) the special inter-carrier arrangement known as the Montreal
Agreement for flights to and from the United States. The limit of liability
for death or injury to passengers is $8300 under Warsaw, $16,600 under
Hague, and $75,000 under the Montreal Agreement. Under the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol the carrier can avoid liability if it can
prove it and its agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures;
under the Montreal Agreement this defense is waived.
The Guatemala Protocol would establish a uniform limit of $100,000 for
the air carrier's liability in cases involving "international carriage" within
the meaning of the Warsaw Convention brought in the courts of States be-
coming Party (Article 22(1) (a) ). Furthermore, to account in part for
the effects of inflation, this limit is to be increased by $12,500 five and
ten years after the Protocol enters into force, unless a conference of Parties
meeting in those years decides (by a 2/3 vote) on a lesser increase (Arti-
cle 42). A general diplomatic conference can be called at any time for
the purpose of revising the limit or any other provisions (Article 41).
Under this Protocol the standard of liability in the case of death or injury
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to passengers is absolute rather than negligence (Article 17 and 21).
Thus, even in a case of death or injury arising out of hijacking or sabotage
of an aircraft or an act of war the carrier will be liable. The carrier will
not be liable in two kinds of cases relating to the passenger's state of health
or the claimant's or passenger's contributory fault. Because the question
of liability will generally not be at issue, the only question open normally
will be the amount of the damage.
A primary objective of absolute liability is to assure a high net recovery to
claimants by reducing the need for and cost of litigating claims. In this
respect, the new Protocol contains a second provision, a "settlement in-
ducement" clause, to encourage rapid and adequate offers of settlement
from carriers without the need for litigation (Article 22(3) ). The pro-
vision provides that a claimant can recover costs, including attorneys'
fees (permitting a recovery above the limit of liability established in the
Protocol), if he gives written notice to the carrier of the amount claimed
and an explanation of the claim and the carrier does not within six months
make an offer of settlement at least as high as the claimant eventually re-
covers.
The limit of liability agreed to at Guatemala was established on the basis
that it could not be exceeded except in the case of settlement inducement
(Articles 22(3)(c) and 24(2) ). The United States accepted the un-
breakable limit of liability without insisting that it be conditioned upon giv-
ing notice by the carrier to the passenger that the Convention limits lia-
bility. States, independently of the Convention, will retain the right to pre-
scribe notice requirements with appropriate enforcement measures to en-
sure compliance.
One of the most significant of the amendments agreed to at Guatemala con-
cerns national systems to supplement recoveries available under the Con-
vention. Article 35A provides that any State may adopt a domestic sup-
plement so long as the supplementary system imposes on carriers neither
an increase in liability nor any financial or administrative burden other
than collecting contributions. The other restraints on the supplement are
that it shall not discriminate among passengers on the basis of the carrier
used, and that its benefits shall apply in every case in which the passenger,
whether or not a national of the State enacting the system, has been re-
quired to contribute to its funding. The purpose of this provision, which is
written in general terms, is to provide a means by which States can adjust
international recoveries to meet national requirements. This constitutes
a departure from the prior concept under which all States were required to
accept internally a common international limit of liability representing a
compromise between the standards of many States and a balance of car-
rier and passenger interests. In accepting this provision, States have thus
explicitly recognized in an international convention that in dealing with the
problem of compensation for damages the differing needs among the par-
ties must be accounted for.
The Guatemala Protocol, taken as a whole, contemplates two possible tiers
of responsibility for liability arising out of the death or injury of passengers.
At the first level, liability up to $100,000, carriers will be responsible with-
out regard to their fault. At a second level, above $100,000, State systems
[Vol. XX:436
1971] PROBLEMS REGARDING AVIATION LITIGATION
may provide compensation for damages in response to their special needs
growing out of such factors as a high standard of living, high cost of living,
or incomplete social benefits for survivors. These national systems might
or might not contain a limit of liability, and their financial burden could be
borne by passengers on flights departing the States enacting the systems.
Of course, both the international regime and the domestic supplements
would operate without prejudice to or effect upon any insurance the
passenger might contract for on an individual basis.
The Guatemala conference agreed on several other amendments to the
Warsaw system. The provision on jurisdiction (Article 28) was amended
to allow suit in the State of domicile or permanent residence of the passen-
ger if the carrier has an establishment in the same State. Previously, ac-
tions were limited to the State where the carrier had its principle place of
business or a place of business where the ticket was purchased, or the State
which was the destination of the flight. The Protocol contains a limit of
liability of approximately $4,000 in the case of delay of passengers (Ar-
ticle 22(1) (b) ). The carrier can avoid liability if it can prove that all
necessary measures were taken to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible to take such measures (Article 20(1) ). For baggage loss or dam-
age the carrier will be absolutely liable (Article 17(a)) . The limit of
such liability is $1,000, and is applicable on a per passenger rather than
per piece or weight basis (Article 22(1) (c) ). No distinction is made
between checked baggage and articles carried on board by the passenger
himself (Article 17(3) ). These revisions are intended to allow stream-
lining of the check-in process by eliminating the present constraints of the
Warsaw Convention requiring weighing of baggage.
The conference was primarily concerned with the rules of liability relating
to passengers and baggage. A review of the cargo provisions was not at-
tempted. The Protocol incorporates the regime and limits of liability for
cargo agreed to in the Hague Protocol (Articles 18, 20(2), 22(2), 24(1),
25, 25A(3), and XVII). This issue is a priority item on the ICAO work
program.
We are now in the process of considering possible supplements to ac-
company submission of the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent,
and we would welcome suggestions from interested parties of particular
schemes including details with respect to legal implementation and an in-
dication of comparative costs for various levels of benefits.
If you should desire further information in regard to the conference at
Guatemala or the substantive decisions that were reached there, or if you
should desire to submit suggestions for a supplement, I would be pleased
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APPENDIX B
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE PRESS
MARCH 17, 1971 NO. 56
U.S. SIGNS PROTOCOL REVISING WARSAW CONVENTION
On March 8, 1971, the United States and twenty other nations signed a
Protocol at Guatemala City to revise the rules of international air trans-
portation established by the Warsaw Convention, as amended at The
Hague in 1955, in regard to air carrier liability for death or injury to pas-
sengers, damage to baggage, and ticketing procedures.
Fifty-five nations were represented at the one-month diplomatic con-
ference, which concluded with adoption of the Protocol by a vote of 36-6.
The provisions of the new Protocol promote the objectives of the United
States as set forth in the Statement of International Air Transportation
Policy approved by the President on June 22, 1970.
The text of the Protocol is attached.
APPENDIX C
PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE CONVENTION FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR SIGNED AT
WARSAW ON 12 OCTOBER 1929 AS AMENDED
BY THE PROTOCOL DONE AT THE HAGUE
ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1955
THE GOVERNMENTS UNDERSIGNED
CONSIDERING that it is desirable to amend the Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as amended by the Protocol done at The
Hague on 28 September 1955,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
CHAPTER I
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION
ARTICLE I. The Convention which the provisions of the present
Chapter modify is the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague in
1955.
ARTICLE ii. Article 3 of the Convention shall be deleted and replaced
by the following:-
"Article 3. 1. In respect of the carriage of passengers an individual
or collective document of carriage shall be delivered containing:
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(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed stopping
places being within the territory of another State, an indication of at least
one such stopping place.
2. Any other means which would preserve a record of the information
indicated in a) and b) of the foregoing paragraph may be substituted
for the delivery of the document referred to in that paragraph.
3. Non-compliance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs
shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage,
which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Convention in-
cluding those relating to limitation of liability."
ARTICLE iii. Article 4 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by following:-
"Article 4. 1. In respect of the carriage of checked baggage, a bag-
gage check shall be delivered, which, unless combined with or incorpo-
rated in a document of carriage which complies with the provisions of
Article 3, paragraph 1, shall contain:
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory
of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed stopping places
being within the territory of another State, an indication of at least one
such stopping place.
2. Any other means which would preserve a record of the informa-
tion indicated in a) and b) of the foregoing paragraph may be substi-
tuted for the delivery of the baggage check referred to in that paragraph.
3. Non-compliance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs
shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage
which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Convention
including those relating to limitation of liability."
ARTICLE IV. Article 17 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following :-
"Article 17. 1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of
death or personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the
event which caused the death or injury took place on board the air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury re-
sulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
2. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of destruction or
loss of, or of damage to, baggage upon condition only that the event
which caused the destruction, loss or damage took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking or during any period within which the baggage was in charge
of the carrier. However, the carrier is not liable if the damage resulted
solely from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the baggage.
3. Unless otherwise specified, in this Convention the term 'baggage'
means both checked baggage and objects carried by the passenger."
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ARTICLE V. In Article 18 of the Convention paragraphs 1 and 2 shall
be deleted and replaced by the following:-
"1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any cargo, if the occurrence
which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage
by air.
2. The carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph
comprises the period during which the cargo is in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing
outside an airport, in any place whatsoever."
ARTICLE VI. Article 20 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following:-
"Article 20. 1. In the carriage of passengers and baggage the car-
rier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if he proves that
he and his servants and agents have taken all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such meas-
ures.
2. In the carriage of cargo the carrier shall not be liable for damage
resulting from destruction, loss, damage or delay if he proves that he
and his servants and agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures."
ARTICLE vii. Article 21 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following:-
"Article 21. If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or con-
tributed to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the
person claiming compensation, the carrier shall be wholly or partly ex-
onerated from his liability to such person to the extent that such negli-
gence or wrongful act or omission caused or contributed to the damage.
When by reason of the death or injury of a passenger compensation is
claimed by a person other than the passenger, the carrier shall likewise
be wholly or partly exonerated from his liability to the extent that he
proves that the damage was caused or contributed to by the negligence
or other wrongful act or omission of that passenger."
ARTICLE VIII. Article 22 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following:-
"Article 22. 1. a) In the carriage of persons the liability of the car-
rier is limited to the sum of one million five hundred thousand francs
for the aggregate of the claims, however founded, in respect of damage
suffered as a result of the death or personal injury of each passenger.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court seised of the case,
damages may be awarded in the form of periodic payments, the equiva-
lent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed one million
five hundred thousand francs.
b) In the case of delay in the carriage of persons the liability of
the carrier for each passenger is limited to sixty-two thousand five
hundred francs.
c) In the carriage of baggage the liability of the carrier in the
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case of destruction, loss, damage or delay is limited to fifteen thousand
francs for each passenger.
2. a) In the carriage of cargo, the liability of the carrier is limited
to a sum of two hundred and fifty francs per kilogramme, unless the
consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed over to
the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination
and has paid a supplementary -sum if the case so requires. In that case
the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless he proves that that sum is greater than the consignor's actual
interest in delivery at destination.
b) In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of the cargo, or of
any object contained therein, the weight to be taken into consideration
in determining the amount to which the carrier's liability is limited
shall be only the total weight of the package or packages concerned.
Nevertheless, when the loss, damage or delay of a part of the cargo, or
of an object contained therein, affects the value of other packages cov-
ered by the same air waybill, the total weight of such package or pack-
ages shall also be taken into consideration in determining the limit of
liability.
3. a) The courts of the High Contracting Parties which are not au-
thorized under their law to award the costs of the action, including
lawyers' fees, shall, in actions to which this Convention applies, have
the power to award, in their discretion, to the claimant the whole or
part of the costs of the action, including lawyers' fees which the court
considers reasonable.
b) The costs of the action including lawyers' fees shall be awarded
in accordance with subparagraph a) only if the claimant gives a written
notice to the carrier of the amount claimed including the particulars of
the calculation of that amount and the carrier does not make, within a
period of six months after his receipt of such notice, a written offer of
settlement in an amount at least equal to the compensation awarded
within the applicable limit. This period will be extended until the time
of commencement of the action if that is later.
c) The costs of the action including lawyers' fees shall not be
taken into account in applying the limits under this Article.
4.The sums mentioned in francs in this Article and Article 42 shall be
deemed to refer to a currency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half
miligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. These sums
may be converted into national currencies in round figures. Conver-
sion of the sums into national currencies other than gold shall, in case
of judicial proceedings, be made according to the gold value of such
currencies at the date of the judgment."
ARTICLE Ix. Article 24 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following:-
"Article 24. 1. In the carriage of cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the condition and limits
set out in this Convention.
2. In the carriage of passengers and baggage any action for damages,
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however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in
tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limits of liability set out in this Convention, without prejudice to the
question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and
what are their respective rights. Such limits of liability constitute
maximum limits and may not be exceeded whatever the circumstances
which gave rise to the liability."
ARTICLE X. Article 25 of the Convention shall be deleted and re-
placed by the following:-
"Article 25. The limit of liability specified in paragraph 2 of Article
22 shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result; provided that in the case of such act or omission of a servant or
agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment."
ARTICLE XI. In Article 25A of the Convention paragraphs 1 and 3
shall be deleted and replaced by the following: -
"1. If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier
arising out of damage to which the Convention relates, such servant or
agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment,
shall be entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability which that car-
rier himself is entitled to invoke under this Convention.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply
to the carriage of cargo if it is proved that the damage resulted from an
act or omission of the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage
or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result."
ARTICLE XII. In Article 28 of the Convention the present paragraph 2
shall be renumbered as paragraph 3 and a new paragraph 2 shall be in-
serted as follows:-
"2. In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or delay of
a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage, the ac-
tion may be brought before one of the Courts mentioned in paragraph 1
of this Article, or in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
before the Court within the jurisdiction of which the carrier has an es-
tablishment if the passenger has his domicile or permanent residence
in the territory of the same High Contracting Party."
ARTICLE XIII. After Article 30 of the Convention, the following Ar-
ticle shall be inserted:-
"Article 30A. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the question
whether a person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions
has a right of recourse against any other person."
ARTICLE xiv. After Article 35 of the Convention, the following Arti-
cle shall be inserted:-
"Article 35A. No provision contained in this Convention shall prevent
a State from establishing and operating within its territory a system to
supplement the compensation payable to claimants under the Conven-
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tion in respect of death, or personal injury, of passengers. Such a sys-
tem shall fulfill the following conditions:
a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his serv-
ants or agents, any liability in addition to that provided under this Con-
vention;
b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or administrative
burden other than collecting in that State contributions from passengers
if required to do so;
c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers with re-
gard to the passengers concerned and the benefits available to the said
passengers under the system shall be extended to them regardless of the
carrier whose services they have used;
d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person suffering
damage as a consequence of death or personal injury of such passenger
shall be entitled to the benefits of the system."
ARTICLE xv. After Article 41 of the Convention, the following Article
shall be inserted:-
"Article 42. 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 41,
Conferences of the Parties to the Protocol done at Guatemala City on the
eighth March 1971 shall be convened during the fifth and tenth
years respectively after the date of entry into force of the said Protocol
for the purpose of reviewing the limit established in Article 22,
paragraph 1 a) of the Convention as amended by that Protocol.
2. At each of the Conferences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Ar-
ticle the limit of liability in Article 22, paragraph 1 a) in force at
the respective dates of these Conferences shall not be increased by an
amount exceeding one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five hundred
francs.
3. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, unless before the thirty-first
December of the fifth and tenth years after the date of entry into force
of the Protocol referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article the aforesaid
Conferences decide otherwise by a two-thirds majority vote of the Par-
ties present and voting, the limit of liability in Article 22, paragraph 1
a) in force at the respective dates of these Conferences shall on those
dates be increased by one hundred and eighty-seven thousand five
hundred francs.
4. The applicable limit shall be that which, in accordance with the
proceding paragraphs, is in effect on the date of the event which caused
the death or personal injury of the passenger."
CHAPTER II
SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION AS AMENDED
ARTICLE XVI. The Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague
in 1955 and by this Protocol shall apply to international carriage as de-
fined in Article 1 of the Convention, provided that the places of departure
and destination referred to in that Article are situated either in the terri-
tories of two Parties to this Protocol or within the territory of a single
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ARTICLE XVII. As between the Parties to this Protocol, the Warsaw
Convention as amended at The Hague in 1955 and this Protocol shall be
read and interpreted together as one single instrument and shall be known
as the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guate-
mala City, 1971.
ARTICLE XVIII. Until the date on which this Protocol enters into force
in accordance with the provisions of Article XX, it shall remain open for
signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the
Specialized Agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or
Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any
other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to
become a Party to this Protocol.
ARTICLE XIX. 1. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory States.
2. Ratification of this Protocol by any State which is not a Party to the
Warsaw Convention or by any State which is not a Party to the Warsaw
Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of ac-
cession to the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and
at Guatemala City, 1971.
3. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Interna-
tional Civil Organization.
ARTICLE XX. 1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth
day after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification on the con-
dition, however, that the total international scheduled air traffic, ex-
pressed in passenger-kilometers, according to the statistics for the year
1970 published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, of the
airlines of five States which have ratified this Protocol, represents at least
40% of the total international scheduled air traffic of the airlines of the
member States of the International Civil Aviation Organization in that
year. If, at the time of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification,
this condition has not been fulfilled, the Protocol shall not come into force
until the ninetieth day after this condition shall have been satisfied. This
Protocol shall come into force for each State ratifying after the deposit of
the last instrument of ratification necessary for entry into force of this
Protocol of the ninetieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratifica-
tion.
2. As soon as this Protocol comes into force it shall be registered with
the United Nations by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
ARTICLE XXI. 1. After the entry into force of this Protocol it shall be
open for accession by any State referred to in Article XVIII.
2. Accession to this Protocol by any State which is not a Party to the
Warsaw Convention or by any State which is not a Party to the Warsaw
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Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of ac-
cession to the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and
at Guatemala City, 1971.
3. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of acces-
sion with the International Civil Aviation Organization and shall take ef-
fect on the ninetieth day after the deposit.
ARTICLE XXII. 1. Any Party to this Protocol may denounce the
Protocol by notification addressed to the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by
the International Civil Aviation Organization of the notification of denun-
ciation.
3. As between the Parties to this Protocol, denunciation by any of them
of the Warsaw Convention in accordance with Article 39 thereof or of the
Hague Protocol in accordance with Article XXIV thereof shall not be
construed in any way as a denunciation of the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City, 1971.
ARTICLE XXIII. 1. Only the following reservations may be made to
this Protocol:-
a) a State whose courts are not authorized under its law to award the
costs of the action including lawyers' fees may at any time by a notifi-
cation addressed to the International Civil Aviation Organization de-
clare that Article 22, paragraph 3 a) shall not apply to its courts; and
b) a State may at any time declare by a notification addressed to the
International Civil Aviation Organization that the Warsaw Convention
as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City, 1971 shall
not apply to the carriage of persons, baggage and cargo for its military
authorities on aircraft, registered in that State, the whole capacity of
which has been reserved by or on behalf of such authorities.
2. Any State having made a reservation in accordance with the preceding
paragraph may at any time withdraw such reservation by notification to
the International Civil Aviation Organization.
ARTICLE XXIV. The International Civil Aviation Organization shall
promptly inform all signatory or acceding States of the date of each sig-
nature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession,
the date of entry into force of this Protocol, and other relevant information.
ARTICLE xxv. As between the Parties to this Protocol which are also
Parties to the Convention, Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air Performed by a Person Other than the Contracting Carrier, signed at
Guadalajara on 18 September 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the "Guada-
lajara Convention") any reference to the "Warsaw Convention" contained
in the Guadalajara Convention shall include reference to the Warsaw
Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City,
1971, in cases where the carriage under the agreement referred to in
Article 1, paragraph b) of the Guadalajara Convention is governed by
this Protocol.
ARTICLE XXVI. This Protocol shall remain open, until 30 September
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1971, for signature by any State referred to in Article XVIII, at the Ministry
of External Relations of the Republic of Guatemala and thereafter, un-
til it enters into force in accordance with Article XX, at the International
Civil Aviation Organization. The Government of the Republic of Guate-
mala shall promptly inform the International Civil Aviation Organization
of any signature and the date thereof during the time that the Protocol shall
be open for signature in Guatemala.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having been
duly authorized, have signed this Protocol.
DONE at Guatemala City on the eighth day of the month of March of
the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-one in three authentic
texts in the English, French and Spanish languages. The International
Civil Aviation Organization shall establish an authentic text of this Proto-
col in the Russian language. In the case of any inconsistency, the text in
the French language, in which language the Warsaw Convention of 12
October 1929 was drawn up, shall prevail.
